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SOVIET INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Oliver J. Lissitzyn
When some five years after the Russian Revolution an attempt was being
made at a conference at the Hague to
settle some of the issues between the
Soviets and the Western European countries, and arbitration was suggested,
Litvinov, the Soviet representative, was
reported to have said:
Commander Hilton Young had
asked whether it would be impossible to find a single impartial
judge in the whole world. It was
necessary to face the fact that
there was not one world but
two-a Soviet world and a nonSoviet world. Because there was
no third world to arbitrate, he
anticipated difficulties ... The
division he had mentioned existed, and with it existed a bias
and a hatred, for which the Russian Government must decline the
responsibility. Only an angel
could be unbiased in judging Russian affairs ...
This statement reflects one aspect of
Communist ideology which has colored
the Sovjet attitude toward international
law-the concept of two worlds between
which there is hatred-the Soviet and
the non-Soviet. In the Soviet Union,
ideology has been closely related to
policy. Let us look at the Soviet ideology and its implications for intern ationallaw.

The Communists profess to interpret
history in terms of the class struggle. On
one side are the exploiters, the capitalists, those who own the means of
production. On the other side are the
toIlers, the proletariat, those through
whose labor the exploiters make profits
for themselves. These two classes are
antagonistic in their interests, and, consequently, hostile to each other. In their
struggle, no holds are barred. In the
capitalist states, government, law, religion and morality are all weapons by
which the capitalists protect their
property interests and keep the workers
in subjection. But, the Communists say,
historical development inexorably
dooms capitalism. Beset by its own
inner contradictions, capitalism is
bound to be overthrown by the workers
in a not too distant future. The Russian
Revolution, in which the workers for
the first time in history succeeded in
overthrowing capitalistic rule, marks the
beginning of the end. When the workers
are finally victorious everywhere, they
will completely destroy the capitalist
system of government, law and
morality. Eventually there will be a
world commonwealth of labor in which
government and law will become unnecessary and fade away, since there
will no longer be any antagonistic
classes struggling with each other. But
before this comes to pass, there is
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bound to be a period of transition, a
period of struggle, since capitalism will
not willingly give way to Communism.
During this period, the workers, wherever they are victorious, as in Russia,
will set up a dictatorship of the proletariat to crush capitalist resistance; they
will seize and use the machinery of
government in their own interests.
In its struggle against capitalism, the
proletariat must not be handicapped by
moral scruples. Lenin said that at this
stage of history morality "is completely
subordinated to the interests of the class
struggle of the proletariat." Recent
Soviet writings leave little doubt that
the advancement of Communism still
remains the supreme criterion of
morality in Soviet ideology. Hatred of
the class enemy-of capitalists as a
class-continues to be regarded as one of
the components of Soviet morality.
Law is regarded by the Communists
as an instrument by which the ruling
class imposes its will on the community.
Vyshinsky, for instance, has defined law
as "the sum total of rules of conduct
expressing the will of the ruling class"
which are enforced "in order to protect,
consolidate and develop such social relations and institutions as are advantageous and agreeable to the ruling
class." In a United Nations debate in
1948, he said that law is nothing but an
instrument of policy; that law and
policy cannot be contrasted.
The law of a state ruled by the
capitalists is bound to be quite different
from the law of a state such as the
Soviet Union, in which the will of the
workers prevails. One is an instrument
of capitalist policy; the other an instrument of the anti-capitalist policy of the
working class. The Communists profess
to find support for their conception of
law in the actual practices of capitalist
governments; they claim that law is
cynically manipulated by capitalists to
suit their own purposes.
At this point, I should admit that my
presentation of Communist philosophy

has been sketchy and oversimplified. I
think, however, that I have presented
enough of the basic ideas to draw the
necessary implications. Let us look at
the matter from the standpoint of a
Communist who takes his ideology seriously.
First, there is no room for any
genuine and lasting community of interest between the Communist and the
non-Communist worlds, since there is
bound to be implacable hostility between them. This does not mean, of
course, that there will be open warfare
all the time; but the periods of relaxation are merely uneasy truces. Neither
side can truly reconcile itself to the
continuing successful existence of the
other. If a genuine community interest
among nations is to be regarded as one
of the foundations of international law,
this foundation would seem to be lacking in the relations between the Communist and the non-Communist states.
Second, the period of transitionthat is, the period of coexistence of the
Communist and non-Communist worlds
-is bound to be a limited one. It will
end in a not too distant future with the
complete triumph of Communism. This
means that Communists have little reason to attach much value to the longrange advantages of the observance of
international law in good faith. If expectations of stability and permanence are
one of the foundations of international
law, this foundation, too, would seem
to be lacking in the relations between
the Communist and the non-Communist
worlds.
Third, since Communists reject capitalist morality and are told that the
advancement of Communism is the
supreme moral imperative, morality in
the traditional sense plays little or no
part in Communist ideology as a basis
for the observance of international law.
Furthermore, law is for the Communists nothing but an instrument of the
policy of the ruling class. In its modern
form, international law has grown up
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among capitalist states; it must, therefore, be an instrument of capitalist
policies. Why should a state controlled
by a class hostile to capitalism have
anything to do with it? Indeed, if law
always expresses the will of a ruling
class and is enforced by it in its own
interest, how can there be any law in
the relations between states ruled by
different and mutually hostile classes?
The will of which of these classes would
it express? Or, is each of the classes to
apply international law only to the
extent and in the way that suits its own
interests and policies?
It is clear that the Communist conception of law as an instrument of
policy makes for a highly practical and
flexible approach. Rules of law are not
absolutes that must be oheyed regardless of consequences; they cannot control policy; they are merely the means
of producing desired results and should
be interpreted and applied accordingly.
It might be expected that since international law was difficult to fit into
Communist ideology it would be declared nonexistent, unreal. Far from it.
Soviet writers, with official blessing,
unanimously uphold the reality of international law. They refer to it as an
attribute of culture and civilization, and
as an essential condition of modern
international relations. Those in the
West who' deny or doubt the reality of
international law are attacked as
nihilists. Soviet leaders from time to
time call for more study of international
law. International law is often invoked
in official Soviet documents and
speeches. In short, the Soviets profess to
recognize international law and even to
lay stress on it. The philosophical difficulties of fitting international law into
the Communist scheme of things have
not heen completely resolved; they still
trouble Soviet writers; but they are not
permitted to stand in the way of professed acceptance of international law
by the Soviet State.
This acceptance, however, is not

complete. For example, Kojevnikov, a
leading Soviet jurist who is now the
Soviet judge on the International Court
of} ustice, wrote in 1948:
Those institutions in interna·
tional law which can facilitate the
execution of the stated tasks of
the USSR are recognized and
applied by the USSR, and those
institutions which conflict in any
manner with these purposes are
rejected by the USSR.
Yet Soviet writers, generally speaking,
are cold to the idea that there are two
completely distinct bodies of international law, one Soviet and the other
capitalist. In this sense, there is no
special Soviet international law. What it
boils down to is that the Soviets accept
international law to the extent that it
suits their purposes. Indeed, the Soviet
leaders are in a somewhat difficult
position. On the one hand, they want to
use international law to serve their own
purposes. For this reason, they must
admit its reality and even try to build it
up. On the other hand, they do not
want international law to be used
against them. The' Soviet position is,
therefore, ambiguous and highly
flexible. Vyshinsky has defined international law as "the sum total of the
norms regulating relations between
states in the process of their struggle
and cooperation, expressing the will of
the ruling classes of these states and
secured by coercion exercised by states
individually or collectively." Note that
"struggle" is put ahead of "cooperati· on. "
What are the Soviet needs served hy
international law? Let us take our cue
from Vyshinsky's reference to struggle
and cooperation-in that order.
After a very brief initial period of
confident expectation that the workers
of the rest of the world would follow
the Russian example and put an end to
capitalism right away, the Soviet leaders
realized that the Soviet and the nonSoviet worlds would coexist for some
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time to come. The Soviet State found
itself in what they call "the capitalist
encirclement. " The capitalist world was,
for the time being, stronger than the
Soviet world. There was little or no
open warfare between the two-except
in part for World War II-but there was
a continuing struggle, a struggle for the
minds of men, and an expectation of
greater struggles to come. The Soviet
world, being the weaker of the two,
needed time-time to strengthen itself
and to weaken the opposition. Under
these conditions, the Soviet leaders
turned to international law. Weak as it
was, it had enough appeal, enough
power to influence people, to be a
useful instrument of Soviet policy.
First and foremost in the minds of
the Soviet leaders was the danger of
intervention from abroad against the
weak Soviet State. Such intervention, in
fact, did take place in the first few years
after the Revolution when civil war still
raged in Russia. Although the Soviet
regime survived, any repetition might be
disastrous. Moreover, the Soviet politieal and economie system was so different from the capitalist system that
the Soviet leaders saw danger in any
tendency for the capitalist states to have
a voice in how the Soviet system should
be run. Naturally enough, the Soviets
appealed to the time-honored prineiples
of sovereignty, nonintervention and
equality of states. These principles
would help them run their own country
wi thout outside interference, and,
despite their weakness, hold themselves
equal to any other state in the world.
The Soviets also emphasized their opposition to forcible annexation of foreign
territory.
The principles of sovereignty and
nonintervention continue to serve the
purposes of the Soviet policy to this
day. For example, when the United
States recently brought up for diseussion the problem of the Soviet satellites
in Europe, the Russians said that such
discussion would amount to inter-

vention in the affairs of sovereign states.
The principle of nonintervention has
been appealed to again and again-for
example, during the Spanish Civil War,
to mobilize public opinion against the
German and Italian help to Franco; and,
more recently, in denunciations of the
help given by the United States to the
foes of Communism in China, Korea,
Guatemala and other countries.
The need of the Soviet leaders to
protect themselves against capitalist
interference is also reflected in various
corollaries of the principle of sovereignty. For example, the Soviets like to
stress treaties rather than eustom as the
chief source of international law. A
treaty is not binding on them unless
they choose to ratify or otherwise
accept it, while a custom-which may
have been formed long before the Russian Revolution-might be held binding
on the Soviet Union even if it did not
manifest its acceptance. Similarly, the
Soviets take a generally negative attitude toward any device whereby any
decision binding on them could be made
without their specific consent. They
oppose all proposals to give any international organization the power to make
decisions on any matter of importance
by a majority vote, unless they retain a
veto power, as in the United Nations
Security Council. As suggested by the
quotation from Litvinov, with which I
opened my talk, the Soviets are skeptical of the value of arbitration in the
settlement of their disputes with other
states, although in all fairness it must be
pointed out that they offered to arbitrate two disputes with the British in
1923 and 1924, and that the offer was
ignored. Although the Soviet Union is a
party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and a Soviet national is
one of the judges, the Soviets have not
agreed to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 of
the Statute and have invariably declined
all offers to submit their disputes with
other countries to the Court. In fact,
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they take pains to attach to multilateral
treaties to which they are parties reservations against the submission of disputes arising under those treaties to the
International Court. The specific reasons for this attitude are not hard to
find. True to their conception of law,
the Soviets do not regard the Court as
standing above politics, but rather as a
body in which the interests of the
capitalist states-from which most of
the judges come-are bound to prevail.
Soviet writers, in fact, do not hesitate to
impute political motives to the judges,
and often speak of an Anglo-American
majority on the Court. In short, the
Soviets are generally not willing to
submit themselves to majority or thirdparty decisions lest such decisions be
used by the capitalists to the detriment
of the Soviet State.
Basically, for the same reason, the
Soviets oppose proposals to give to
individuals any effective rights in international law. Soviet writers, in fact,
refuse to recognize individuals as subjects of international law. If individuals
had such standing, the capitalist states
would have a pretext for interfering
with the control which the Soviet
leaders exercise over their own people.
The Soviets like to exercise their
territorial sovereignty with as few restrictions as possible. They deny, for
instance, that foreign warships have a
right of innocent passage through territorial waters-a point still unsettled in
the West-and refuse to enter into any
general agreements permitting foreign
aircraft to fly over Soviet territory.
Another international law principle
which the Soviets have stressed as a
means of self-protection is the principle
of nonaggression. Before World War II,
the Soviet Union negotiated a number
of treaties with neighboring states defining and forbidding aggression. In the
League of Nations, the Soviet representatives were loud in their denunciations
of the aggressions committed by the
Japanese, the Italians, and the Germans,

and in the protestations of the peaceful
intentions of the Soviet Union. This
policy produced considerable goodwill
for the Soviets in the democratic countries at that time. Since World War II,
the Soviets have participated in the
trials of the major German and Japanese
war criminals, and have been recently
insisting on the adoption by the United
Nations of a definition of aggression.
The interest of the Soviet leaders in
the protective function of international
law is also reflected in the laws of war.
Two distinctive Soviet positions may be
mentioned here: (1) the Soviet espousal
of the lawfulness of guerrilla warfare
behind the lines, and (2) the denunciation of weapons of mass destruction
such as atom bombs and germ warfare.
So far as guerrilla warfare is concerned,
the Soviets appear to be conscious of its
usefulness in case of a foreign invasion
of the Soviet Union, which was in fact
demonstrated in World War II, as well as
in civil wars and anticolonial revolts in
other countries. We all know the success
with which the Communists have used
guerrillas in China, Vietnam, and other
places. The Soviet writers maintain that
guerrillas are lawful belligerents,
apparently drawing the conclusion that
they are entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war. The Soviet denunciations of the weapons of mass destruction may be attributed in part to consciousness of the fact that at this time
the use of such weapons would not be
to the advantage of the Soviet Union
and its allies, but they also serve an
important propaganda purpose. These
denunciations appeal powerfully to the
natural revulsion of people everywhere
against such horrible weapons as the
H-bombs and disease germs, and, particularly, to the weaker or more exposed countries.
This brings me to another point. The
Soviets use the slogans of international
law only to help prevent measures
which threaten their own security or
freedom from outside interference.
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They use them to stir up resentment
against their opponents and to attract
support. We all recall the great propaganda campaign against the alleged
American resort to bacteriological warfare in Korea. The principles of sovereignty, nonintervention and equality of
states have been constantly invoked by
Soviet spokesmen and propagandists in
their attacks against the United States.
For example, the Marshall Plan, NATO,
and American bases abroad have all
been denounced as violations of the
principles of sovereignty and equality,
and as devices through which the United
States interferes in the affairs of other
states. Furthermore, Soviet writers and
spokesmen invoke the principle of selfdetermination as if it were an accepted
principle of international law to stir up
colonial and minority peoples against
their rulers-and, in so doing, undoubtedly gain the sympathy of many such
peoples. The laws of war are appealed to
in denunciations of alleged atrocities by
troops fighting against the Communists,
as in Korea. The use of international law
slogans as a psychological weapon became particularly intense at the height
of the cold war, during the conflict in
Korea. Since the death of Stalin and the
end of the Korean conflict the tone of
Soviet propaganda has moderated, but
international law is still drawn upon
heavily.
You may ask whether the espousal
by the Soviets of such principles as
sovereign ty, nonin terven tion, nonaggression and self-determination does not
hamper the Soviets themselves in the
achievement of their aims. But it is clear
that the Soviets, who regard international law as an instrument of policy
and who recognize it because it suits
their purposes, would not let it stand in
the way of achievement of important
policy aims. Soviet officials, it is true,
never openly deny that international
law exists or that it is binding on the
Soviet Union. There are several ways,
however, of preventing international law

from interfering with Soviet policy. One
way, as I have already indicated, is to
reject explicitly certain of the rules as
unacceptable to the Soviet State and to
insist on certain new rules. There are
other, and probably more effective,
ways. Many of the rules of international
law are vague and uncertain, leaving
much room for interpretation. Not infrequently there are contradictory
precedents and authorities to choose
from. As Professor Hazard says, "Soviet
authors and statesmen pick and choose
among the precedents to meet their
needs, and they do so quite openly."
The Soviet approach to international
law, it must be repea!:ed, is very flexible.
Kojevnikov, in his 1948 book, emphasizes that international law must not be
interpreted in an "abstract dogmatic"
fashion. In fact, the principles the
Soviets profess to espouse do not deter
them from pursuing policies in apparent
conflict with these principles. The principle of nonintervention, for example,
has not prevented the Soviets from
giving aid to subversive movements and
Communist guerrillas abroad. Or, take
the matter of nonaggression. As I have
already pointed out, the Soviets profess
to be unalterably opposed to aggression;
they make nonaggression pacts; they are
also said to oppose annexations and to
favor self-determination. When the time
came, however, this did not stop them
from taking aggressive action against
their neighbors, such as Poland, the
Baltic States and Finland, with all of
whom they had nonaggression pacts.
The principle of nonaggression,
furthermore, should be compared with
the definition of just and unjust wars
laid down in 1938 by Stalin himself and
faithfully repeated by Soviet writers.
Listen carefully to this definition: "Just
wars-wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to
defend the people from foreign attack
and from attempts to enslave them, or
to liberate the people from capitalist
slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies
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and dependent countries from the yoke
of imperialism, and Unjust wars-wars
of conquest, waged to conquer and
enslave foreign countries and foreign
nations. » It is hardly open to doubt that
this Stalinist doctrine of just war will be
used to justify any war the Soviet
leaders choose to wage. Furthermore,
there are indications in Soviet literature
that only those who are fighting a
so-called just war will be regarded as
entitled to the full benefits of the laws
of war.. For instance, guerrilla warfare
seems to be regarded as lawful only
when waged as part of a just war. This is
an important point to remember. In
fact, the doctrine of just war may be the
key to the full understanding of the
Soviet conception of international law.
It takes us back to the Communist
conception of morality. Only he who
wages a just war, or a just struggle, has
any rights. And the Communists regard
their struggle against capitalismwhether or not it takes the form of
open war-as just. Therefore, anything
goes in the struggle against capitalism.
Soviet spokesmen and writers never
tire of proclaiming that the Soviet
Union faithfully observes all treaties
concluded by it on a basis of freedom,
equality .and reciprocity. That the
Soviets do attach some importance to
the observance of treaties would seem
to be indicated by the fact that they
frequently take pains to protect legally
their freedom of action on particular
points by making express reservations.
In other words, the Soviet leaders prefer
to avoid situations in which their treaty
obligations might come in obvious conflict with their policies. It has also been
noted that the more specific and clear
the treaty obligation is, the less room
there is for divergent interpretationsthe . less likely are the Soviets to violate
it. Yet, the record of observance by the
Soviets of their treaty obligations, particularly in matters of political importance, has not been such as to inspire
general confidence. Even allowing for

reasonable differences in interpretation
and for the uncertainty of the rules of
international law concerning termination of treaties, the behavior of the
Soviet Union has given the impression
that its promises are not to be trusted. I
have already referred to the nonaggression pacts which did not prevent the
Soviets from invading or coercing certain of its neighbors. Certainly the
failure to withdraw troops from Iran
after the end of hostilities in World War
II was a clear violation of a treaty
obligation. The Soviets have failed t~
keep may promises not to support
subversive activities abroad. The United
States felt compelled to protest in 1935
against the Soviet violation of such a
promise less than two years after it had
been given. Soviet behavior in Eastern
and Central Europe after World War II
has been generally regarded in the West
as not in conformity with the agreements at Yalta and Potsdam. Many
other examples could be given.
There is still another device which
helps the Soviet Union to get around
international law and which cannot be
left out of any realistic account of
Soviet behavior. This device is misrepresentation of the facts. This seems
to be the standard device, for example,
in justifying the Soviet role in border
incidents. It is always the American or
other foreign airplane that invades
Soviet territory and starts shooting. And
you may recall the Soviet version of
how the conflict in Korea started in
1950-it was the South Koreans who
attacked first. This device is also frequently used when the Soviets are
charged with promoting subversion
abroad. The facts are simply denied.
So far, I have talked primarily of the
use of international law in Soviet policy
as a weapon in the struggle against the
so-called capitalist encirclement. The
picture is not encouraging. You will
recall that Vyshinksy in his definition of
international law mentioned cooperation as well as struggle. The Soviet

83
leaders recognize that a period of coexistence with the capitalist encirclement may last for some time to come.
During this period of relatively peaceful
relations it may be, and often has been,
to the advantage of the Soviet State to
eo operate with the capitalist states for
various purposes. In fact, the building
up of the economic and military power
of the Soviet State, particularly in the
early days, required commercial and
other eeonomic relations with the outsidc world, and the avoidance of excessive friction which might lead to open
warfarc. Participation in international
organizations of political, as well as
technical, character has also been
decmed neccssary in the interests of the
Soviet State. Finally, on occasion the
Soviet State found itself allied with
some eapitalist states against common
encmies, as was the case during World
War II. International law has been recognized by the Soviet leaders as a useful
device for the facilitation of peaceful
and cooperative relations with the outside world when Soviet policy calls for
them.
As a matter of fact, there has been a
considerable measure of routine observance of international law by the
Soviets. For example, aside from certain
claims to territorial waters, about which
I shall speak later, the Soviets have by
and large respeeted the principle of the
freedom of the seas. Despite occasional
incidents involving foreign diplomatic
personnel in Moscow, the Soviets have
observed the generally recognized rules
of diplomatic relations with most
capitalist states. Before World War lIt
thousands of foreign technicians worked
in the Soviet Union, helping to develop
Soviet industry. Again, with some exceptions, the Soviets treated these foreigners in accordance with recognized
international standards. The Soviet
record of observance of nonpolitical
commitments-for example, commercial
agreements and technical arrangements-has been appreciably better than

their record with respect to political
treaties, such as nonaggression pacts.
During World War II, the Soviets generally honored their strictly military commitments to their allies. All of this
indicates that the Soviet Union is perfectly capable of observing international
law when its leaders believe it to be in
their interest.
Yet, it must be noted that Soviet
writers have on occasion stated that
cooperation with the capitalist world is
itself a form of struggle.
At this point, I should like to mention some distinctive factors other than
Communist ideology that enter into the
Soviet interpretation and application of
international law.
First, the nature of the Soviet political and economic system. This system,
to be sure, is in large part an outgrowth
of Soviet ideology; but, once established, it acquired a life of its own and
its own needs which may persist even if
the ideology is changed or no longer
taken seriously.
One of the features of the Soviet
system is the totalitarian control of the
population by the government. This
control, for full effectiveness, requires a
limitation on the contacts of the Soviet
population with the outside world; it
requires a monopoly of the information
which is allowed to reach the people.
This is an important source of the
restrictions placed on the travel of
Soviet citizens abroad and of foreigners
in the Soviet Union, as well as such
devices as the jamming of foreign broadcasts. It also accounts in part for the
refusal to recognize individuals as having
rights in international law, and the
reluctance of the Soviets to enter into
any agreement whereby they would be
required to permit free entry to foreign
nationals or officials. It has possibly
entered into the Soviet coolness toward
disarmament control plans which involve wide travel in the Soviet Union by
foreign inspectors. The totalitarian controls and the restrictions on contacts
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with foreigners tend to distort even the
information available to the leaders
themselves; they prevent full understanding of the reactions to Soviet
policies abroad; and they interfere with
the development of any nonofficial concensus between Soviet citizens and foreigners even on the professional level of
international law. The complete governmental control of all economic activity,
particularly that involving foreign trade
and shipping, means the absence of
private economic interest groups which
in the West have had a lot to do with
the development and enforcement of
certain international law standards and
institutions. All of this tends to set the
Soviets apart from the main stream of
world thinking and feeling, and accentuates the peculiarities of the Soviet approach to international law.
The Soviet state monopoly of foreign
trade and shipping has, indeed, direct
effects on the Soviet interpretation of
international law. Since all Soviet trade
is conducted by government agencies,
the Soviets steadfastly uphold the traditional principle that governments and
their property are immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts even when
engaged in ordinary commercial activities abroad. This principle is being increasingly questioned and modified in
the non-Soviet world. The Soviets also
insist that their trade representatives
abroad are entitled to diplomatic immunities. As suggested by Professor
Hazard, this may have other than a
commercial objective, since immunity
facilitates espionage and subversive
activities; nevertheless, a number of
European and other non-Soviet states
have agreed to accord immunity to such
representatives, since Soviet foreign
trade is a state monopoly, and foreigners, if they want to do business with
the Soviets, have no choice but to deal
with official Soviet agencies.
Another distinctive factor is the geographical position of the Soviet Union.
Russia has always been primarily a land

power. Its maritime power has been
handicapped by the absence of good
outlets on the open ocean and the fact
that entrances to the seas bordering it
are largely controlled by other nations.
Naval power has more often figured in
history as a means of attack on Russia
rather than as an instrument of aggression on Russia's part. There are, furthermore, valuable fisheries off the coasts of
Russia. All of this makes it natural for
Russia to try to extend its territorial
waters as far as possible through various
devices, and to gain control of the
entrances to the seas bordering it. A
tendency to extend the Russian territorial waters to twelve miles, instead of
the three miles favored by the major
maritime powers, appeared already
before the Revolution, although it was
manifested in the form of claims of
jurisdiction for customs and fishery
control rather than in terms of outright
sovereignty. The Soviets inherited and
strengthened this tendency. Although
Soviet statutes do not seem flatly to
assert Soviet sovereignty in a zone
twelve miles wide-speaking rather in
terms of control for security and other
purposes-there can be little doubt that
the Soviet Union does claim today a
12-mile zone of territorial waters. In all
fairness, it should be noted that this
claim seems modest in comparison with
the 200-mile claims recently made by
some Latin American States. Nevertheless, it has been a cause of frequent
controversies with other powers, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and the Scandinavians.
The Soviet Union maintains that each
state may fix the width of its territorial
waters in the light of all the attendant
circumstances.
A further example of the tendency
to extend Soviet territorial waters may
be seen in the statements of Soviet
writers that four seas bordering the
Soviet Union on the north-the Kara,
Laptev, East Siberian and Chukot (or
Chukchi)-are in reality territorial bays;
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that is, a part of Soviet inland waters,
rather than high seas. There is a hint
that the same principle may apply to
thc Sea of Okhotsk. As yet, there seems
to have bcen no occasion on which the
Soviet government made such claims
officially. The White Sea, however, is
definitely treated as a part of Soviet
inland waters.
Another claim made by Soviet
writers and apparently espoused by the
government is that certain seas bordering Russia are closed seas, because they
do not constitute waterways used for
navigation other than that to and from
the littoral states and, therefore, navigation on them is of concern only to the
latter, which are entitled to regulate it
in their own interests even to the point
of forbidding access to outsiders. This
concept of the closed seas, which should
be distinguished from that of territorial
waters, is novel in modern international
law. The Black Sea and the Baltic Sea,
as well as the landlocked Caspian Sea,
are regarded by Soviet writers as closed
seas. Recent reports indicate that the
Soviet Union has proposed to Japan
that the Sea of Japan should be declared
a closed sea, on which navigation by
warships of outside powers would not
be allowcd. The Sea of Okhotsk, if not
claimed by the Soviets as a territorial
bay, might also be regarded as a closed
area.
As yet, the Soviet concept of the
closed sea does not seem to have had
much practical effect. Russia, however,
has always been interested in the control of the Turkish Straits leading to the
Black Sea. Although the Soviets are a
party to the Montreux Convention of
1936 on the Regime of the Turkish
Straits, they have not been entirely
satisfied with it, since it does not
completely bar the Black Sea to the
warships of outside powers and places
some restrictions on the passage of
warships of the Black Sea powers, entrusting Turkey with the enforcement
of its provisions. The Soviet Union

would like to amend the convention to
remove these objectionable features. It
would also like to control the Straits
itself. At present, three of the four
Black Sea powers-the Soviet Union
itself, Rumania and Bulgaria-belong to
the Soviet block. Soviet proposals to
give the control of the Straits and of the
navigation of the Black Sea to the Black
Sea powers would, therefore, give the
Straits the preponderant influence.
Another consequence of Russia's
geographical position is her espousal of
the so-called sector principle in the
Arctic. This principle, invoked by the
Russian government before the Revolution, would permit Russia to claim all
the islands in the Arctic Ocean up to the
North Pole, including those not yet
discovered or possessed, within the
limits of a sector-like a slice of a
pie-defined by the meridians at the two
opposite extremities of the Russian territory bordering On the Arctic. Canada
also favors the sector principle, although
it has maintained it less bluntly. You
can easily see why both Russia and
Canada are in favor of it. Although the
sector principle cannot be said to have
obtained general recognition, the Soviet
Union does in fact control virtually all
of the islands claimed by it. Since there
seems to be no additional land to be
discovered, the sector principle has
ceased to be much of an issue so far as
lands in the Arctic are concerned. There
has been a tentative suggestion in the
Soviet literature, however, that the
sector principle should be extended to
cover not only land but water and the
air space as well, making the Arctic
Ocean all the way to the Pole a part of
Soviet territory. Some Soviet writers
have also claimed ice fields within the
sector. There is no definite indication as
yet that the Soviet government is preparing to make such claims official.
Although the Soviets favor the sector
principle in the Arctic, Soviet writers
deny that it applies in the Antarctic,
citing the differences in the geographical
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situation. The Soviet Union has made
no formal claims to any territory in the
Antarctic, but has insisted that Russian
discoveries in that region in 1819-1821
entitle it to a voice in any general
settlement of the problem of the con·
trol of the Antarctic, and has protested
against the claims of some other states.
Although the Soviet interest in the
extension of territorial waters, the concept of the closed seas, the sector
principle in the Arctic, and related
matters, is largely determined by the
geographical position of Russia, and is a
traditional Russian interest not related
to Communist dogma, it is heightened
by the Soviet ideology of hostility to
the outside world and the needs of
totalitarian controls. The Soviet position on these matters is obviously related to the security of the Soviet State,
living in a hostile environment, against
any attack or interference from the
outside. Should Soviet ideology be
eliminated, it may be expected that any
government of Russia will continue to
favor the twelve-mile zone and the
sector principle, but possibly with less
vehemence.
Under what conditions may we
expect the Soviet Union to observe
international law? And what of the
future?
Before attempting to suggest any
answers to these questions, I should like
to compare briefly the Soviet attitude
toward international law ,vith the attitudes in the non-Soviet world. This will
give us a better perspective.
Many aspects of the Soviet attitude
find a counterpart in the non-Soviet
world. Surely it would be ridiculous to
assert that in the non-Soviet world
international law is observed with perfect regularity; that treaties are always
kept; that expediency never enters into
the interpretation and application of
international law; that international law
is never used for propaganda purposes;
or that facts are never misrepresented.
Indeed, there is a strain in Western

thought, going back at least to Machia·
velli, which would make expediency
the sole basis for the observance of
international obligations. As you may
recall, Machiavelli said that a prince
should not honor his promises if it is to
his disadvantage to do so. In more
recent times, the same kind of attitude
has given rise to the idea that raison
d'etat, necessity or self-preservationoften very broadly interpreted-justifies
a state in doing anything. Furthermore,
there is a school of thought in the West
that advocates flexible interpretation
and application of international law,
pointing out that rules of law are not
absolutes that have to be obeyed for
their own sake; that they are means to
some end, instruments of policy, and
that they should be so interpreted and
applied as best to achieve desirable
results. In the absence of universal
agreement on the values and goals to be
served by the rules of law, this idea,
meritorious though it may be in principle, often means that a decision-maker
feels free to interpret international law
flexibly to serve the purposes he happens to favor. There are also people who
deny the reality of international law.
Am I trying to say there is no
difference between the Soviet and the
non-Soviet attitudes toward international law? Not at all; there are very
important differences, but we should
understand their nature and sources.
First of all, in the non totalitarian
West, side by side with the idea that the
observance of law is a matter of expediency, there has always been another
idea-that observance of the law is a
moral obligation, that law and morality
have objective validity, and that they lie
at the very foundation of civilized
existence. There is a tradition of respect
for law that carries over into international affairs. The overall Western attitude toward international law is a composite, a blend in varying proportions,
of these two principles-the principle of
expediency and the principle of moral
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obligation. Communist ideology, on the
other hand, leaves no room for a feeling
of moral obligation to observe the law
when its observance is not expedient for
the Soviet States. In fact, the very
existence of objective and universally
binding moral principles is denied. This
difference is accentuated by the absence
in most of the non-Soviet world of
totalitarian controls and forced conformity to any single ideology. In the
Soviet State, ideas contrary to those
favored by the leaders cannot be publicly expressed; on the surface, Communist ideology, the ideology of expediency in international relations,
reigns supreme.
Probably even more important is
another difference. As I have previously
indicated, Communist ideology means
that the Soviet Union regards all of the
non-Soviet states as basically its enemies. Peaceful cooperation is bound to
be temporary and for limited purposes
only. It is expected that eventually
Communism will prevail over all its
enemies and so-called peaceful coexistence will come to an end. It is this
sense of basic hostility and the temporary nature of any accommodation
that distinguishes most profoundly the
underlying Soviet attitude toward international relations, including international law. Without it, incidentally,
there would be less incentive for the
Communists to reject universal, reciprocally binding, moral principles. In
the non-Soviet world, no such feeling of
ineluctable and lasting hostility normally enters into relations between different states. In fact, most of the states
of the world have an expectation of
friendly and lasting coexistence with
most of the other states. This is often
true even when they go to war with
each other-the war is regarded as a
temporary condition which does not
necessarily mean undying hostility between the two nations. In the relations
between non-Soviet states, therefore,
even though expediency be the under-

lying principle, much greater value is apt
to be put on reasonably faithful observance of international law as a condition
of stability and orderly coexistence. The
long-range value of good faith is apt to
be better appreciated.
Differences between the Soviet and
the non-Soviet economic systems are
another factor. They reduce still further
the element of a community of interest
as a foundation of international law.
In the light of the foregoing, under
what conditions can we expect the
Soviets to observe international law?
The obvious answer is that the
Soviets will observe international law
when it is to their advantage to do so.
The question, then, is when is it to their
advantage? I have already given some
partial answers to this question. Immediate advantages do flow to the
Soviets from the observance of international law on their part in a variety of
situations.
First of all, unless the Soviets are
prepared to go to all-out war with the
rest of the world, it is to their advantage
to observe international law to the
extent necessary to avoid excessive friction with other nations. Here is where
the rules of territorial sovereignty, jurisdiction, freedom of the seas, treatment
of aliens, and the like-as well as treaties
dealing with these matters-come in.
The Soviet Union normally does observe
many of these rules.
Second, reciprocity and retaliation
play a part in the observance of international law. To the extent that limited
cooperation with non-Soviet countries is
desired by the SovieLUnion, it is likely to
observe reasonably well the rules governing such cooperation. There is no guarantee, however, that a shift in Soviet policy
may not at any time put an end to the
Soviet interest in the observance of any
of these rules. Fear of retaliation is
another factor which may be expected to
induce the Soviet Union to observe international law. This may be true, for
instance, with regard to the laws of war.
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Third, the Communist leaders are by
no means unmindful of world public
opinion-or of public opinion in the
countries with which they want to deal.
A striking confirmation of this fact can
be seen in the recent agreement of the
Bulgarian Communist government to pay
damages for the shooting down of an
Israeli airliner and to punish those responsible for it. Many observers have
noted that the Soviets are less likely to
violate a treaty if it is specific and
unambiguous. This is another confirmation of the value of public opinion. The
Soviets try to avoid committing clear
violations which would shock public
opinion.
These factors may be called the
short-range advantages to the Soviets of
the observance of international law. To
the extent such factors work, internationallaw does make a difference, even
though we cannot rely on the Soviets
carrying out their obligations in good
faith. The treatment of the prisoners
taken by the Communists in Korea, bad
as it was, might have been even worse if
there had been no international standards at all.
Communist ideology, as I have indicated, minimizes the long-range value of
the observance of international law,
since Communists do not believe in
lasting coexistence between the Soviet
and the non-Soviet worlds. Yet, it is not
inconceivable that this may change. If
Soviet leaders become convinced that
the so-called capitalist world is here to
stay, they may come to appreciate the
advantages of stability and good faith.
Such an evolution may be helped along
by greater contacts with the outside
world. In short, Soviet leaders may
come to redefine their interests. Communist ideology will certainly har,nper
such a reappraisal of the Soviet position
in the world; but it may not prove to be
an insuperable obstacle. The doctrine of
the implacable hostility of the two
worlds may be reinterpreted or quietly
given up as an effective guide to policy.

Perhaps it has already been given up in
Yugoslavia by the Tito Communists. As
Toynbee has pointed out, this has happened to the Moslem doctrine of the
holy war against the infidels, which no
longer stands in the way of peaceful
relations between Moslem and Christian
nations. Reinterpretation of ideology is
not new in Communist history.
Indeed, although I have stressed
ideology as an important factor in
Soviet policy, the precise role of Soviet
ideology has long been a subject of
controversy in the West. Some observers
are inclined to believe that ideology is
an instrument rather than a determinant
of Soviet policy. I happen to believe
that ideology has exerted a substantial
influence on Soviet policy. But it may
not be the decisive factor. When we deal
with human emotions and motivations,
we are pretty much in the dark. The
personality factor should not be discounted. Stalin ruled as a dictator for
some twenty-five years, and Soviet
policy could not but reflect his personality. We cannot tell as yet what
influence ideology will have on the
policies of the new generation of Soviet
leaders now coming to power. Should
the idea of lasting hostility between the
two worlds be given up, fairly stahle
relations under international law may be
established even if the principle of
expediency continues to prevail, pro·
vided that the interests of the Soviet
State are defined moderately and intelli·
gently.
If there is any hope at all that the
Soviet leaders, present or future, may
develop a more constructive attitude
toward international law, what policies
of the non-Soviet world are likely to
assist in this process?
First, the Soviets must be continually
impressed with the strength and stability of the so·called capitalistic world.
This means that we-i.e., the whole
non-Soviet world, not just the United
States-must not only remain strong
militarily, but must have a rate of
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economic development and general
progress at least equal to that of the
Soviet bloc. At the same time, we must
continue to make it plain that we are
men of peace and that we are not
opposed to genuine peaceful coexistence with the Soviet bloc if the
Soviet leaders make it possible. We
should also try to break down the
intellectual isolation of the Soviet countries by encouraging their contacts with
the non-Soviet world.
Second, our agreements with the
Soviet Union and its allies should be so
designed that it will be to their own
continuous advantage to keep them. Indeed, this is a good principle to be
followed in all international negotiations.
As Professor Briggs has well said, "the
treaties most likely to be observed are
those which recognize and develop within a legal framework a positive mutuality
of in terests." The making of such treaties
obviously requires much wisdom and
skill. It is also wise to make all agreements
with the Soviets in writing, and as clear
and specific as possible.
Third, it should be our normal policy

to interpret international law fairly and
to apply it in good faith. Indeed, if the
non-Soviet nations should cease to take
international law seriously and get into
the habit of manipulating it for immediate advantage, why should the Soviets
behave differently? Such behavior will
merely confirm their belief that law is
an instrument of policy cynically used
by the capitalists for their own gain.
The only way to teach the Soviet
leaders the value of international law is
for us to practice it. If, by way of
exception and for our self-preservation,
we are compelled to depart from law,
we should make it clear that the behavior of our adversaries leaves us no
choice.
Fourth, we must react firmly and
vigorously against all clear violations of
international law to our detriment. International law itself provides for
measures of retaliation and reprisal-not
necessarily armed reprisals-against its
violations. We should use all suitable
means to prove that violations of international law do not pay; and that good
faith does pay.
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